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In this paper, the likely effects of an environmental fiscal reform in Namibia are examined 
using a Computable General Equilibrium model. Namibia is a natural resource rich country 
with poverty alleviation as one important target on the policy agenda. One way for the 
government of simultaneously ensuring both a sustainable use of the resources and a less 
skewed income distribution might be to introduce an environmental fiscal reform, where taxes 
on natural and environmental resources (fish rents, energy and water) are recycled in order to 
give additional benefits (in terms of GDP, employment and income distribution) to the 
economy. The results indicate that for some recycling options, there is scope for additional 
benefits. Subsidizing unskilled labour would give the most favourable result, at least in terms 
of real GDP and employment. However, poverty might not only be a question of employment; 
since food constitutes a significant part of poor households’ expenditures, a decrease in taxes 
on food might be an interesting option if GDP, employment, income distribution and 
environmental impacts are considered in combination. 
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The welfare consequences of environmental tax reforms, where higher environmental taxes 
partly replace other taxes, have been subject to a considerable research effort in the last few 
decades. So far, environmental tax reforms have mainly been implemented and studied in the 
US and Europe, where the main focus has been on energy taxation, and whether a second 
dividend (in addition to the welfare gain from a cleaner environment) in terms of GDP and/or 
employment can be obtained by using the environmental tax revenues to reduce other 
distorting taxes in the economy.
1 As the theoretical and empirical evidence for whether there 
exist additional benefits is mixed, the effects of an environmental tax reform need to be 
evaluated in each specific case.
2  
 
In recent years, along with an intensified debate about linkages between poverty and the 
environment in international development policy, environmental tax reforms have slowly 
started to gain interest also in the literature on developing countries. As the design of 
environmental policy reforms in developing countries might differ from the reforms analysed 
in the mainstream literature mentioned above, this is often referred to as environmental fiscal 
reform rather than tax  reform in the literature on developing countries.
3 In addition to 
environmentally related taxes on pollution, the design of an environmental fiscal reform in a 
developing country might also include taxes on natural resource use (e.g. forestry and 
fisheries) and user charges or the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies (e.g. on water 
and electricity use).
4 Another feature distinguishing environmental fiscal reforms in 
developing countries from those studied in the US and Europe is that in poor countries, the 
poverty issue might not necessarily only be related to employment; poverty is often more 
widespread and can, to a greater extent, also be related to, for example, the prices of 
commodities that constitute a significant part of the poor households’ expenditures (food).  
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994), Goulder (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), 
Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1998), Bovenberg (1999) and Bosquet (2000). 
2A review of the results from the above mentioned studies shows that there are many different factors affecting 
the outcome of an environmental tax reform; for example, the type of model used (the number of sectors and 
production factors) and the level of complementarity between factors of production. A general result, though, is 
that additional benefits in terms of efficiency are improbable, unless there are initial distortions in the tax system 
or in the market (such as unemployment). 
3 OECD (2005). By definition, environmental fiscal reform refers to a range of taxation and pricing mechanisms 
aiming at providing economic incentives to correct market failures in the management of natural resources and 
the control of pollution.  
4 Bosquet (2000). 
  2In this paper, the likely effects of an environmental fiscal reform in Namibia are examined 
using a Computable General Equilibrium model. Since Namibia is a country highly dependent 
on its natural resource base (especially mining, fishing, agriculture and nature-based tourism) 
and has one of the world’s most unequal income distributions (the gini-coefficient is 0.7)
5, the 
Namibian government has to find ways of reducing the intensity of the resource use while, at 
the same time, reducing poverty and inequality. One interesting option for achieving both 
these targets simultaneously would be to implement an environmental fiscal reform, where 
taxes on natural and environmental resources are recycled in order to give additional benefits 
in terms of increased GDP, increased employment and a less skewed income distribution. The 
purpose of this analysis is to find out whether a revenue-neutral environmental fiscal reform, 
where revenues from taxation on resource rents in the fishing sector, the removal of 
environmentally harmful water subsidies and the introduction of a CO2-tax are recycled to the 
economy, may give rise to benefits such as increased output, increased employment and lower 
income inequality. The economy-wide effects are analysed for five different revenue-neutral 
scenarios, which differ according to the way in which the environmental fiscal revenues are 
recycled; a) a general decrease in the commodity sales tax rate, b) a decrease in the 
commodity sales tax rate on food only, c) subsidization of unskilled labour, d) an increase in 
direct governmental transfers to all households (general transfers) and e) an increase in direct 
governmental transfers to poor households only (targeted transfers).  
 
The reform studied in this paper is similar to that of another recent CGE-based study on South 
Africa, where a triple dividend, in terms of reduced emissions, increased GDP and reduced 
poverty is found if the environmental tax revenues from increased energy or water taxation 
are recycled through a reduction of taxes on food.
6 A shift of focus from employment to 
income distribution and poverty can also be seen in another CGE-based study of the Chilean 
economy, where it is shown that the combination of environmental and social policies (in 
terms of increasing governmental transfers to households) is of critical importance for the 
distributional consequences of a fiscal reform.
7 While the two above examples include 
environmental and/or natural resource policies, there are other examples of CGE-based 
studies in developing countries primarily focusing on the distributional and poverty impacts 
                                                 
5 This number comes from the Namibian Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) 1993/1994. 
6 Van Heerden et al. (2006b). See also Van Heerden et al. (2006a) for a similar environmental fiscal reform, but 
where water taxation is not included. 
7 O’Ryan et al. (2005). 
  3of non-environmental policies. There are several studies showing that the tax and transfer 
systems in developing countries can be reformed to achieve distributional benefits.
8  
 
An important contribution of this paper, which also distinguishes it from the South African 
studies by Van Heerden et al. (2006a, 2006b), will be to emphasize the potential non-
environmental effects of using rent taxation in the design of an environmental fiscal reform in 
natural resource rich developing countries. Even though taxation of rents is often pointed out 
as an important approach to environmental fiscal reform in developing countries, there are 
few studies focusing on pure resource rent taxation. According to Bosquet (2000), one reason 
for this is that while prices remain unchanged, rent taxation does not create any immediate 
incentives for resource conservation, i.e. there is no direct quantifiable effect on 
environmental quality, at least not in a short-run analysis where effects on entry and exit are 
not considered. Another reason why rent taxation is rarely analysed is that there are usually no 
available estimates of the sizes of actual resource rents.
9 With respect to the latter, Namibia, 
with its relatively well developed system of Natural Resource Accounting, provides an 
interesting example for rent taxation analysis. 
 
As the environmental effects of resource rent taxation cannot be measured in a static CGE-
model, the main focus of the analysis will be given to the recycling of the revenues from the 
perspective of alleviating poverty. As compared to the studies by Van Heerden et al. (2006a, 
2006b), which also include a reduction of direct and indirect taxes as recycling options, 
another contribution of the present paper is the analysis of additional recycling options of 
increasing general and targeted transfers to households.  
 
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 background information on the Namibian 
economy is presented while in section 3, the different parts of the environmental fiscal reform 
are described. This is followed by a discussion of the model and data in section 4. A 
description of the different simulation scenarios is given in section 5 and in section 6, the 
results of the simulations are presented. Section 7 provides the concluding remarks.  
 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Go et al. (2005) and Chitiga (2000). 
9 Although the role of resource rent taxation in environmental fiscal reforms has previously been acknowledged, 
the potential effects on the economy of recycling such revenues have not been investigated. In a study of the 
Russian Federation by Bosquet (2002), rents for oil, gas and timber were estimated, followed by a proposal to 
introduce a revenue neutral fiscal reform (shifting the tax base from capital and labour to natural resources), 
without an explicit analysis of the likely effects on the economy of such a reform. 
  42. Namibia 
 
Namibia is a country that is highly dependent on its natural resource base: mining, fishing, 
agriculture and wildlife based tourism. With a per capita income of USD 3 000 per year, 
Namibia is, by definition, a middle-income country.
10 However, these statistics hide the fact 
that Namibia’s income distribution, measured by a gini coefficient of 0.7, makes Namibia one 
of the most unequal countries in the world.
11 Furthermore, the official unemployment rate is 
approximately 35 per cent




An explanation of the current state of the economy, as well as of the main goals of 
development policy in Namibia, can partly be found in the history of the country. On March 
21, 1990, Namibia gained independence after a 70-year period of South African rule.  During 
that period, many of Namibia’s natural resources were exploited in a non-sustainable way and 
the benefits did not always accrue to the Namibian population. The highly skewed income 
distribution is, to a large extent, a heritage from the South African apartheid regime; a small 
white minority of the population still owns most of the land and businesses and the richest 1 
per cent of the population consumes the same amount as the poorest 50 per cent.
14 Since the 
independence, the government has been struggling to set up policies which can contribute to a 
sustainable management of the resources that form the basis of the economic activity in the 
country and, at the same time, ensure that the economic development will reduce inequality.
15
 
The ratio of government expenditures over GDP is 34 per cent in Namibia, which is a rather 
high number when compared to other developing countries. A high level of government 
expenditures, especially within education and health, has been motivated in order to increase 
                                                 
10 These are countries with a per capita income between USD 906 and USD 11 115; see World Bank (2007). 
11 This official figure is based on the Namibian Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) 1993/1994 
which, according to the World Bank, makes Namibia  the most unequal country in the world. According to the 
preliminary NHIES 2003/2004, the gini-coefficient has fallen to 0.6. However, this would still place Namibia 
among the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income distribution. 
12 The estimated unemployment rate in the labour force survey 2000 was 34.5%, while it was 36.7% in 2004.  
13 This estimate comes from Van Rooy (2006) who uses the 1993/1994 NHIES, so this percentage might change 
according to the 2003/2004 survey. 
14 The Namibian Central Bureau of Statistics (2002). 
15 One example of such a policy is the development of the “Nature Conservation Act” in 1996, which enabled 
the establishment of community based conservancies through Namibia’s Community Based Natural Resource 
Management Programme. By creating incentives for rural local communities to invest in nature based tourism 
activities, a sustainable management of wildlife as well as poverty reduction could be achieved simultaneously.  
  5the chances for poor people of finding employment or becoming self-employed.
16 However, 
in terms of combating poverty and the highly skewed income distribution, these policies do 
not seem to have been very successful. Namibia’s tax burden accounted for about 29 per cent 
of GDP in the financial year 2004/2005, which can also be considered a high figure as 
compared to other developing countries.
17 The structure of governmental tax revenues can be 
seen in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Governmental Revenue Structure 
Governmental Revenue structure, 2001/02 
Tax Revenue 89.31%
   Taxes on income and profits 33.65%
      - Income tax on individuals 19.43%
      - Company taxes 13.28%
                   - Diamond Mining Companies 5.41%
                   - Other mining companies 0.63%
                   - Non-mining companies* 7.24%
   Taxes on property 0.51%
   Domestic taxes on goods and services (VAT) 22.22%
   Taxes on International trade and transactions  30.10%
Non-Tax Revenue 8.44%
(for example diamond royalties)
Other Revenue
(for example external grants) 2,25%
*of which actual fish rents constitute about 50 %.   
Source: Schade (2005). 
 
As can be seen from the table, the main source of revenue for the government is taxes on 
international trade and transactions within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
18, 
followed by taxes on profits and income and the General Sales Tax (or VAT).  
 
Although the Ministry of Finance has expressed the need to introduce environmental taxes in 
Namibia, there are currently no environment-related taxes except for a tourism levy charge
19 
                                                 
16 New classrooms and clinics have primarily been built in poor rural areas.  
17 Schade (2005). 
18 The member countries of SACU are South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. All customs 
duties are collected through SACU’s common revenue pool in South Africa and then distributed according to a 
“revenue sharing formula” based on each member country’s share in intra-SACU trade. For Namibia, this 
implies that the SACU revenues appear as a lump sum, where the amount is higher than the actual SACU tariffs 
collected due to the revenue sharing formula. According to a new SACU agreement in 2004, the current system 
for revenue sharing will be changed into a less favourable distribution for Namibia in the near future.  
  6as well as park entry fees to partly cover the costs of wildlife conservation. Although a fuel 
levy system is currently in place, it is not expected to give any significant environmental 
effects. The levy is not motivated by environmental concerns; it is low and only levied on 
three fuels; petrol, diesel and paraffin.
20  
 
According to a study by Rakner (2002), the tax base in Namibia is not used to its full potential 
because of evasion and a number of tax exemptions considered to erode the tax base. Certain 
groups of tax payers, such as farmers, fishing companies and the mining sector, pay little tax 
in comparison to their contribution to GDP, which might seem surprising as commercially 
exploited resources usually generate considerable rents; a potential source of government 
revenue. A further investigation of the taxation of the two main natural resource sectors in 
Namibia, mining and fishing, shows that in the mining sector, a considerable part of the 
resource rent is actually being taxed while in the fishing sector, only about 20 per cent of the 
rent are captured by the government.
21  
 
Rakner also points out that Namibia’s skewed income distribution might imply that the 
current tax system is effectively regressive. Although – in comparison to the situation in many 
other African countries – the Namibian government has been successful in many respects, the 
pronounced governmental goals of ensuring a sustainable and equitable development calls for 
further revisions and developments of the economic policy. To achieve such an integrated 
policy, one option would be to look for opportunities to implement environmental taxes that 
can be redistributed in a way that might have positive effects on GDP and employment as 
well as lead to a more equal income distribution. This paper aims at analysing the likely 
welfare effects of a specific environmental fiscal reform where the additional tax revenues can 
be used to reach distributional and other objectives. 
 
The potential benefits in terms of increased GDP, increased employment and reduced income 
inequality in Namibia will depend on how the production and consumption patterns are 
affected by the environmental tax reform. In fact, as there is a significant level of 
unemployment among unskilled labour in Namibia, the effects in terms of increased 
employment and real GDP may, to a large extent, depend on how the environmental tax 
                                                                                                                                                          
19 A special levy included in the price for accommodation. 
20 Humavindu and Barnes (2006). 
21 Lange (2003). 
  7reform affects demand for unskilled labour. If, for example, environmental taxes mainly affect 
skilled labour (which is considered to be fully employed) and other fixed factors, while the 
demand for unskilled labour is increased via revenue recycling, unemployment will most 
likely be reduced in the Namibian economy.
22 When it comes to income distribution, poverty 
might not only be a question of employment but also of the prices of commodities that 
constitute a significant part of the poor households’ expenditures. Therefore, a change in 
prices of food might also affect the outcome in terms of poverty and income distribution in 
the model. 
 
3. Environmental fiscal reform in Namibia 
 
In situations involving externalities, economists have long favoured the use of taxes as a 
corrective instrument. In Namibia, important sectors like fishing, agriculture and wildlife-
based tourism are highly dependent on a sustainable management of the natural resources 
fish, land, water and wildlife biodiversity. In this paper, fish and water are included in the 
environmental fiscal reform, while wildlife and land are not. This does not mean that these 
resources are less important – rather, as the tourism sector is the sector considered to have the 
largest potential to grow in the future, biodiversity conservation should be taken seriously, 
and considering the fact that farmers currently pay little tax in comparison to their 
contribution to GDP, the taxation of land rents would be interesting to take into consideration. 
However, due to the lack of appropriate data from the tourism sector as well as estimations of 




Namibia has made renewable resources a case of high priority and attempts to increase the 
share of energy sources like solar, wind, wave and biomass of the national energy 
production.
24 This makes it interesting to include increased taxation of CO2-emissions in an 
                                                 
22 As there is no choice-mechanism between leisure and work for the households in this model, employment of 
unskilled labour is determined by firm demand for unskilled labour. The assumption of involuntary 
unemployment is therefore important for the possibilities of increasing employment via revenue recycling in this 
model.   
23 Although lack of data prevents the inclusion of appropriate levels of such taxes, simulations are carried 
through with approximate levels of such taxes to give intuition to how the inclusion of such taxes would most 
likely affect the outcome of an environmental fiscal reform. See Appendix B and Appendix E, respectively, for a 
discussion of these simulations. 
24 In the energy chapter of the second National Development Plan, which is the most recent energy policy 
document, alternative energy uses, like renewable resources, are encouraged. Through “The Energy White 
  8environmental tax reform. The three parts of the environmental tax reform studied in this 
paper are: taxation of the resource rents in the fishing sector which may reduce long-run 
incentives for overfishing, the removal of water subsidies which will increase the price of 
water used in the currently subsidized sectors (the shortage of fresh water is currently 
considered to be the main constraint to development in Namibia), and an increase in the 
energy tax (based on actual carbon content) that can lead to lower CO2 emissions. The 
additional tax revenues are then recycled in different ways, by a decrease in indirect 
commodity taxes, subsidization of unskilled labour or increased direct governmental transfers 
to households. The different parts in the fiscal reform are described in more detail below.  
 
3.1. Taxation of rent in the fishing sector 
 
During the period of South African occupation, Namibia’s fisheries often operated as an open 
access resource, which resulted in a depletion of the fish stocks. After the independence, a 
new fishing policy with two main objectives was implemented: i) to ensure ecologically 
sustainable management of the fisheries and ii) to significantly increase the share of benefits 
for Namibians from the fisheries sector, especially those previously excluded from the 
industry due to discriminating laws during the apartheid regime.
25  
 
To achieve the first part of the fishing policy, the government sets quotas for the total fish 
catches allowed every year. The existing quota levies have been shown to be considerably 
lower than the actual rents generated by the fishing industry. The non-taxed rents appear as 
higher than normal profits
26 in the fishing sector, which means that there are still incentives 
for overfishing and, as a result, the government is exposed to lobbying from the fishing sector 
for an increase in the fishing quotas.
27  
 
The second objective can be interpreted to fit into the broader context of the government’s 
focus on policies of alleviating poverty. Even if quotas have been allocated to new companies 
that were not established in the industry before the independence, the only way for the poorest 
                                                                                                                                                          
Paper”, the government has committed itself to introducing more renewable energy resources and the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy (see website http://www.mme.gov.na/energy/policy.htm) is working actively towards this 
goal.  
25 Lange (2003). 
26 Resource rent is the income to the fixed factor: in this case fish. 
27 According to Manning (2000), many of the new companies have been involved in the fishing industry by way 
of rent seeking, i.e. searching for opportunities to trade in fishing permits, rather than practically developing the 
capacity to manage their own fishing activities.  
  9people of gaining benefits from the resource that initially belongs to the country as a whole is 




Even if progress has been made both considering the goal of increasing Namibian’s share of 
benefits and in halting further depletion of the fish stocks, there is a growing concern that too 
much of the economic benefit still accrues to foreign companies and it is obvious that the 
expected recovery of fish stocks to the high levels last observed in the 1960s has not occurred. 
Consequently, there are reasons to further increase the taxation of the rents generated in this 
sector. Although rent-capturing may not influence the short-run incentives for overfishing, at 
least not much, there are reasons to believe that this will have a positive effect on the 
sustainability of the fisheries in the long run, as it will decrease the currently high level of 
entry into the industry. Calculations based on Namibia’s national accounts show that the 
percentage of the rent collected by the government has decreased from 50 per cent after the 
independence to about 20 per cent by the year 2000.
29  
 
3.2. Reducing environmentally harmful subsidies for water 
 
Although water is an extremely scarce resource and is considered to be the main constraint to 
development for Namibia, the financial costs for providing water were heavily subsidized 
during the period of South-African occupation, especially for the commercial farming 
sector.
30 Since its independence, Namibia’s water policy has changed and the new Water 
Resources Management Act
31 emphasizes the need to recognize the economic value of water. 
To promote an economically efficient water use, water tariffs should reflect the full 
opportunity cost of water, including the direct costs of providing water as well as the 
environmental impact. Studying the published data on costs of providing water compared to 
the tariffs paid by end users, it is clear that full direct cost recovery pricing had not yet been 
achieved by the year 2001-2002.
32 Actually, Lange (2006) found an error of underestimation 
in the cost of irrigation water in these figures and she concludes that especially commercial 
                                                 
28 Lange (2003). 
29 Lange (2003).  
30 See Lange (2006). 
31 See Water Resources and Management Act 2004. 
32 See Technical Summary of Water Accounts − Department of Water Affairs 2006. Although the share of end-
users that pay the full cost for water has increased significantly since the 1990’s, some sectors continue to be 
heavily subsidized. 
  10irrigated crop production continues to be heavily subsidized. Even though taxation would be 
the appropriate tool for capturing the full social costs of water, no estimations of the full 
social costs for water supply are available at present. The fact that water is a basic necessity 
further complicates the construction and implementation of a system of water taxes if it is not 
to harm the poorest households. Therefore, in this paper, the elimination of the total amount 
of water subsidies is implemented as a first step towards full social cost recovery of the water 
supply. It is important to note that the current government is actually working towards full 
private cost recovery and this study will highlight the possible economy-wide effects of 
implementing the first step of such a policy.  
 
3.3. Energy taxation 
 
A third option for environmental taxation in Namibia would be increased energy taxation. 
Namibia is not a major player when it comes to carbon emissions and as a non-Annex I 
country in the Kyoto protocol, Namibia has no international obligations to reduce emissions 
in the first commitment period 2008-2012. However, even without binding international 
targets for reducing carbon emissions, the use of CO2 taxation may be an interesting option to 
consider. Namibia has made renewable resources a case of high priority and attempts to 
increase the share of sources like solar, wind, wave and biomass of the national energy 
production. At present, domestically produced electricity is mainly hydroelectric power, and 
although there exists a coal based power plant in Namibia, this is rarely used for production. 
As domestic electricity production does not cover domestic demand, the remaining part is 
imported (coal based electricity) from South Africa. Further, there is no domestic production 
of petroleum products in Namibia; all oil based fuels are imported. 
 
At present, only petrol, diesel and paraffin are subject to a fuel levy, the main objective of 
which is to finance the maintenance of the road network system. It would be a reasonable step 




                                                 
33 This is actually proposed by Humavindu and Barnes (2006) in a study about possible financing options for 
biodiversity conservation and a sustainable use of natural resources in Namibia. 
  11This paper analyses the effects of introducing a tax on the final consumption of petroleum 
products.
34 This tax is based on actual carbon content in the different fuels, which implies that 
the fuel tax simulated in this paper is a CO2-tax, although based on the consumption of fuel 
and not on the emissions themselves.
35 From a distributional point of view, as most of the 
poorest households do not drive their own car and mainly use the informal forest sector to 
collect their fire wood, these households may not be significantly affected by a higher 
petroleum tax, thereby suggesting that this policy could be easier to motivate from an equity 
perspective than a tax on water.  
 
3.4. Options for revenue recycling 
 
In many developing countries, there is a particular concern that any attempt at improving the 
environment through higher taxes will have negative effects on development in the country. 
Therefore, in this study, the focus is on the possibilities of recycling the tax revenues from the 
environmental tax reform in a way that might lead to benefits in terms of increased GDP, 
increased employment and alleviating poverty. The additional tax revenues will be recycled in 
five different ways, where the first two alternatives refer to decreased indirect taxation; first as 
a decrease in the general commodity sales tax rate (or VAT) and then as a decrease in the 
commodity sales tax on food only.
36 A comparison of these options in terms of income 
distribution will be of particular interest as poor households spend relatively more of their 
total expenditures on food than other households. The third option considers a subsidy 
towards employing unskilled labour. The above three recycling options are similar to the 
recycling options studied in two studies of South Africa by Van Heerden et al. (2006).
37 The 
last two ways of recycling the additional tax revenues are general and targeted governmental 
transfers. While general transfers might be unnecessarily costly depending on how large the 
                                                 
34 Although the intention was to implement a coal based CO2-tax also for imported electricity consumption, it 
was decided to exclude this from the analysis. The reason is that in this kind of model, a price increase for only 
imported electricity would imply substitution into more domestically produced electricity, but as only the 
residual demand currently is imported, such a substitution is not possible in the short run as domestic production 
is used to its full capacity. However, as petroleum products constitute the main source of CO2-emissons in 
Namibia, the exclusion of a tax on imported coal based electricity will be of minor importance for the analysis of 
overall CO2-emissions. 
35 See section 4.2.3. for further discussions of data for the energy sector. 
36 The general VAT rate in Namibia is 15%. 
37 In the two studies by Van Heerden et al. (2006), where there are pre-existing factor taxes for both capital and 
labour, both these taxes are decreased by means of revenue recycling. According to the authors, the reason for 
decreasing both factor taxes is that the South African Revenue Service would not be inclined to favour one factor 
of production over another in tax adjustment schemes. In Namibia, where no factor taxes are reported for capital 
or labour in the SAM, a subsidy of unskilled labour is used as a recycling option. This is motivated by the high 
rate of unemployment within this labour category. 




4. The CGE model and data 
 
4.1. The model 
 
The model used for the simulations is based on a generic CGE model for developing country 
analysis, developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). CGE models 
have become a standard method for economic policy analysis and have, for example, been 
used in the analysis of taxation, structural adjustment and trade policy. This specific model 
has been used in numerous studies on macro economic policies in developing countries, 
especially African countries
39, and it follows the standard neoclassical modelling tradition on 
which all original general equilibrium models are based. More specifically, the IFPRI model 
derives its basis from the well-known neoclassical-structuralist CGE-framework of Dervis et 
al. (1982), where the model agents’ production and consumption decisions are driven by the 
maximization of profits and utility, respectively. In some respects, the model allows the user 
to depart from the typical neoclassical Walrasian modelling tradition, for example by 
allowing for structural rigidities like fixed wages and absence of factor mobility. These 
features of CGE-modelling have become increasingly popular, especially in the developing 
country literature, as they often represent a more realistic and practical way of modelling the 
functions of the economy in these countries.
40 The model makes use of comparative static 
analysis: a shock to some of the exogenous variables causes the relative prices to change and 
the economy adjusts to a new equilibrium. The values of the endogenous variables following 
from the policy-shock can then be compared to the values in the base-year equilibrium. This 
section provides a brief summary of the model; for a full documentation of the original model, 
see Löfgren et al. (2002). A formal description of the model equations is found in Appendix 
C. 
 
                                                 
38 See section 4.2.4. for an explanation of how the (imperfect) targeted transfers are carried out in this study.  
39 Examples of macro-policy studies in African countries where the generic IFPRI CGE-model is used; Malawi: 
Löfgren et al. (2001), South Africa: Thurlow (2002) and Go et al. (2005) and Tanzania: Eskola (2005).  
40 See, for example, Van Heerden et al. (2006) where a similar CGE-model for South Africa is used and the high 
unemployment rate among low skilled workers is explicitly modelled by a fixed wage for this particular labour 
category. This wage rigidity is an important driving force for the results of the policy analysis. 
  134.1.1. Production 
Each producer is assumed to maximize its profits subject to the production technology in a 
perfect competition setting: the firm takes prices of output, production factors and other inputs 
as given. Production technology is divided into two levels; the top level, representing the 
substitution decision between intermediate inputs and factors of production and the second 
level, representing the choice between factors of production. At the top level, a Leontief 
specification is used, implying no substitutability between factors of production (value added) 
and intermediate inputs in production. At the second level, a CES function is used to represent 
the substitutability between primary factors used in the production. The share of composite 
commodities used as intermediate inputs in the production is determined by a Leontief 
technology. The structure of the production technology is shown in figure 1 below.
41 As a 
result of profit-maximization, each producer uses a set of factors up to the point where the 
marginal revenue product of each factor is equal to its factor price.  
 














produced    




                                                 
41As a Leontief production structure is used for intermediate inputs, the model does not allow for substitution in 
production between, for example, energy or water and other intermediate inputs. (For factors of production, 
though, a CES function is used, allowing for substitution in the production between capital and labour, for 
example.) This structure of limited substitution for intermediate inputs on the production side is standard in most 
CGE-models and is also used in the model by Van Heerden et al. (2006) where it is motivated by a short-run 
time horizon for the simulations.  
  144.1.2. Institutions 
The institutions in the model include households, enterprises (firms), the government and the 
rest of the world. Households receive income from the factors of production (directly from 
labour and indirectly via enterprises from capital) and transfers from other institutions. The 
income is then used for direct tax payments, saving, consumption and transfers to other 
institutions. Household consumption is allocated across different commodities according to a 
linear expenditure system (LES), implying that the consumption spending for a specific 
commodity is a linear function of total consumption expenditure.
42 The consumption pattern 
differs across household groups due to different consumption shares of each commodity and 
different elasticities of market demand for each commodity between the different household 
groups.
43 Enterprises receive factor income from capital and transfers from other institutions. 
This income is then allocated to direct taxes, savings and transfers to other institutions. The 
government collects taxes from sales, households and enterprises, import and export and 
value added and receives transfers from other institutions. All taxes are treated as fixed ad 
valorem taxes. This income is used for consumption and transfers to institutions. All transfers 
to or from the rest of world are fixed in foreign currency. Foreign savings constitute the 
difference between foreign currency spending and receipts.  
 
4.1.3. Commodity Markets 
The model allows for one single activity to produce more than one commodity and for one 
commodity to be produced by more than one activity. The first step is therefore to generate 
aggregated domestic output from the output generated by different activities for a given 
commodity, using a CES aggregation function. Demand for the output of each activity is 
based on minimizing the cost for supplying a given quantity of aggregated output. For each 
disaggregated commodity, activity-specific commodity prices ensure that the market will 
clear.  
 
Aggregate output is allocated between exports and domestic sales based on suppliers’ revenue 
maximization, subject to a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function, which 
                                                 
42 The linear expenditure system contains the first-order conditions resulting from the maximization of a Stone- 
Geary utility function, i.e. it is assumed that for each household, a minimum level of some good must be 
consumed, irrespective of its price or consumer income. After subsistence has been achieved, the relative 
contribution of each commodity to utility can be considered. 
43 The consumption shares are taken from the SAM, while the elasticities differ slightly between rich and poor 
household groups (using the same pattern of elasticity values as in the CGE study of South Africa, from which 
the elasticities are mainly taken). See section 4.2.5. for the elasticities data.  
  15implies that although the supply of exports is determined by the relative price of exports and 
domestic goods, the producers’ maximization of sales is subject to imperfect substitutability 
between export and domestic sales. Export demands are assumed to be infinitely elastic at 
given world prices, and export prices are expressed in domestic currency by adjusting the 
world price with the exchange rate and potential export taxes.  
 
Domestic demand consists of household and government consumption, investment and 
intermediate inputs. If a commodity is imported, domestic demand is measured for a 
composite commodity which comprises imports and domestic output. The consumers’ choice 
between domestically produced and imported variants of the same commodity is subject to 
imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic commodities represented by a CES 
aggregation function.
44 International supplies are assumed to be infinitely elastic at given 
world prices.  
 
The assumptions of imperfect transformability between exports and domestic output, and 
imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic output are made to better reflect the 
empirical realities of most countries and this is a standard assumption in CGE-modelling. 
Figure 2 below presents an overview of the flow of marketed commodities in the model.   
 




































Source: Löfgren et al. (2002). 
                                                 
44 This CES-function is called the Armington function and is used to prevent unrealistic import and export 
responses to policy changes as it allows for some independence of the domestic price system as compared to the 
international one. 
  164.1.4. System constraints 
In addition to the behavioural assumptions for the agents described above, the model 
equations also include a set of constraints that must be satisfied for the system as a whole, 
which is not necessarily considered by any individual agent. These include constraints for 
factor- and commodity markets and macroeconomic aggregates.
45 With regard to the factor 
markets, this paper follows Van Heerden et al. (2006) by assuming the capital stock in each 
sector to be fixed, while the rate of return is allowed to vary. The same assumption holds for 
the fish factor as well as the mixed factor used in agricultural production.
46 This is the 
standard way in which capital and land are modelled in static CGE-models in developing 
countries and it is motivated by the relatively short time horizon. The labour market in 
Namibia is divided between skilled and unskilled labour, where skilled labour is characterized 
by full employment while there is significant unemployment among unskilled workers. To 
reflect this division, the two different labour categories are treated differently in our model. 
Skilled labour is assumed to be fully employed and mobile between sectors. In terms of model 
specification, this implies that supply is fixed while an economy-wide wage rate can be freely 
adjusted to ensure that demand equals supply. On the other hand, the real wage rate for 
unskilled labour is fixed to allow for unemployment among unskilled workers.
47  
 
Concerning the macroeconomic aggregates, an important assumption is that all tax rates, 
except those collected via the fiscal reform, are fixed. Foreign savings are also assumed to be 
fixed in the model, which prevents any misleading short-run effects on household welfare in a 
single-period-model.
48 The level of real government consumption and real investment is 
exogenous and thus not assumed to be affected by the policies in question and the model 
numeraire in all simulations is the Domestic Producer Price Index (DPI).
49 A full description 
of the macroeconomic model constraints is found in Appendix D.  
 
                                                 
45 These constraints are satisfied by different model closure rules. By choosing closure rules, the user determines 
which variables should be exogenous and which should be endogenous; see Appendix D for a specification of 
the alternative closure rules available. 
46 See section 4.2. for a clarification of this mixed factor. 
47 It is the real wage rate (after factor tax) for unskilled labour that is fixed, i.e. the after tax nominal wage rate 
deflated by the consumer price index. This allows for variation in the firm’s labour costs if the factor tax and/or 
the general price level changes. These factor closure rules coincide with the factor market closure rules used in 
similar studies dealing with environmental tax reforms in South Africa; see Van Heerden et al. (2006). 
48 An increase (decrease) in foreign savings will cause a rise (fall) in household welfare. These results might be 
misleading in a single-period model as the analysis does not capture welfare losses (benefits) in later periods that 
arise from a smaller (greater) foreign debt. See Appendix D for a further discussion of this closure rule. 
49 As the model is a real model, only relative prices are of importance and a numeraire must be chosen. All 
simulated price and income changes are interpreted as changes in comparison to the numeraire price index. 
  174.2. Data 
 
The primary database on which the CGE model is built is the preliminary Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for Namibia from 2002 (full documentation is given in Lange et al. 2004).
50 
The SAM divides the economy into 26 sectors of production, five factors of production and 
six household groups according to their main source of income. To make the model easier to 
solve numerically, a number of the smaller manufacturing and service sectors as well as the 
different commercial agricultural sectors have been aggregated when fed into the CGE-model. 
 
The factors of production included in the original SAM are unskilled labour, skilled labour, 
capital, a mixed factor in the commercial agricultural sectors (representing a mix of farm 
owners’ labour, capital and a land component) and a mixed factor in the traditional 
agricultural sector (analogous to that in the commercial sectors, but with a negligible capital 
component). The reason for using the mixed factors in the database is that it is difficult to 
distinguish between different types of earnings of self-employed farmers; the surplus of sales 
revenue over input costs includes a payment for own labour, own capital input as well as land 
input. Therefore, in the national accounts, this surplus is left as “mixed income”.  
 
Some small adjustments in the SAM (concerning the traditional agricultural sector and tourist 
data) were necessary for the data to fit the standard model set-up and purpose of analysis. 
These small adjustments are described in Appendix B, while the data adjustments as well as 
the complementary data for the more important sectors are described in this section. 
 
4.2.1. Fish-sector data 
To study the effects of a larger share of the resource rents captured by the government within 
the fishing sector, fish needs to be included in the current SAM as a factor of production in 
the fish and fish processing sectors. This is done by making use of the resource rent (as factor 
income distributed to different households etc.) estimated through the Natural Resource 
Accounts (NRA) methods for fish.
51 In the original SAM, the factor income for capital in the 
                                                 
50 A SAM is an economy-wide data framework representing the economic structure of a country for one year. 
Technically, it is a square matrix where each account is represented by a row and a column where the incomes of 
an account appear along its row and its expenditures along its column. The economy is disaggregated into 
factors, activities (production), commodities and institutions. The sum of each row (total revenue) must equal the 
sum of each column (total expenditure) in the SAM. 
51 The Namibian fisheries accounts are based on the UN System of Integrated Environmental and Economic 
Accounts (SEEA). See Lange (2005) for a detailed description of the methodology for fish-rent calculations. 
  18fishing sector contains a capital rent component and a fish rent component. To identify the 
latter, which is the factor income attributable to the production factor fish, the total amount of 
fish rent is redistributed from the total capital rents in the fish sectors into actual fish rents 
instead. According to these resource rent data, in the year 2001 (which is the latest year for 
which the resource rent is calculated) 20 per cent of the total rents were actually captured by 
the government. These captured rents appear in the original SAM as a part of the business tax 
in the fishing sectors. For the purposes of this study, the amount of taxed fish rents is 
transferred from the business tax account to a direct tax on fish rents, which also constitutes a 
more correct specification than the former way of presenting rent taxes in the SAM. The rest 
of the total fish rent is distributed as factor incomes to enterprises and foreign factor owners 
according to the same distributional shares by which capital rents are distributed. This 
adjustment opens up the possibility of studying the effects of an increased share of the fish 
rent captured by government – through an increase in the direct tax on fish rents.  
 
4.2.2. Water data 
There is no information about water subsidies in the SAM from 2002. The sectors subjected 
to significant water subsidies by the year 2001-2002, corresponding to actual sectors in the 
SAM, are mainly the agricultural sectors (commercial crop and livestock production) and 
private services.
52 In the SAM, water is considered to be an intermediate input in production 
and not a factor of production. As only a few sectors actually pay the lower price for water, 
the SAM needed to be extended to include a second water commodity, which represents the 
water bought by the subsidized sectors only. The removal of the water subsidies will reduce 
the current incentives of over-use in these water-intensive sectors. In total, the amount of 
water subsidies is only about N$ 15 million, only constituting a small part (about 4 per cent) 
of the total environmental tax revenues.
53  
 
4.2.3. Energy data 
To calculate the environmental tax to be levied on fuels, an official energy balance for 
Namibia from the year 1999 is used. This is the latest energy balance compiled for the 
                                                 
52 See Lange (2006). While urban households in general pay more than the actual private cost of providing 
water, poor rural households are subsidized. However, as the current water accounts do not distinguish between 
different categories of households, only the production sectors subjected to water subsidies can be included in 
the analysis. 
53 As the subsidies are not included in the original data – and a chain of different assumptions would have to be 
made in order to include them in the SAM – this environmental policy is actually modelled as an increased tax 
on the sector-specific water in the model simulations. This will be of minor importance as the direct effects of a 
removal of subsidies or an introduction of a tax on the currently subsidized sectors will be the same. 
  19economy and as energy production and consumption between the years 1999 and 2002 have 
most likely not changed to any considerable extent, the different years for the energy balance 
and the SAM should not constitute any major problem. In the energy balance, there is 
information about which fuel types are actually included in the aggregated petroleum 
commodity account in the SAM. The implemented tax is based on the actual final 
consumption of petroleum products (according to the carbon content) and not actual 
emissions by production sector.
54 This can be seen as a fuel tax, where the tax rate for the 
commodity “petroleum products” is calculated as the CO2-tax
55 multiplied by the carbon 
content of petrol, diesel and all other products included in the petroleum product account 
found in the Namibian national accounts for 2002. The carbon content in the total 
consumption of petroleum products is calculated by using the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) default conversion factors.  
 
4.2.4. Household data and the Representative Household approach 
The household groups in the SAM are divided into six different subgroups according to their 
main source of income. These groups are 1) urban households who receive their income from 
wages and salaries, 2) urban households involved in business activities including farming, 3) 
urban households who depend on pensions, cash remittances and other sources of income, 4) 
rural households who receive their income from wage and salary, 5) rural households within 
business activities and commercial farming and 6) rural households depending on subsistence 
farming, pensions, cash remittances
56 and other sources of income. Although the household-
data is poor in the sense that the households are not divided by income deciles in the SAM, 
the division into separate socio-economic income groups makes it possible to identify the 
households in terms of location and income source, which is often decisive for the general 
living conditions. This approach to studying poverty and income distribution effects is called 
the Representative Household (RH) approach which represents the most common approach 
used among the vast literature of dealing with the links between different macro-reforms and 
                                                 
54 The tax is levied on industrial use as well as household consumption of petroleum products. As Namibia does 
not produce any petroleum products domestically, there is no problem of energy losses from converting coal to 
petroleum, which is otherwise the main reason why emissions should be taxed at the point of combustion rather 
than consumption.   
55 The level of CO2-tax used here is 35 Rand per tonne CO2 (≈ 35 N$), following van Heerden et al. (2006). This 
rate is based on estimations of the global climate change damage costs by Sandor (2001) which, according to van 
Heerden et al. (2006), correspond well with the median of marginal climate change damages reported in the 
literature. 
56 These are private intra-household transfers of income, for example regular transfers from a family member 
working away from home or occasional gifts. These transfers often play a significant role for poor households in 
developing countries. 
  20changes in poverty and income distribution through CGE-models.
57 This approach implies 
that changes in income in the subgroups are interpreted as changes for all households within 
the group. The main drawback is that the within-group income distribution is not taken into 
account, but the reason why this approach is the most popular is the lack of more detailed data 
in developing countries.  
 
When it comes to assigning which household groups are the poorest – and thereby should be 
subject to targeted transfers − it would be interesting to know more about the household 
groups than the total income given in the SAM. Average income per household within each 
household group was calculated using available data on the total income of each household 
group (provided in the SAM) together with data on the actual number of households in each 
household group (provided in the preliminary report of the Namibian HIES 2003/2004).
58 The 
average income is lowest for urban households including pensions, cash remittances and other 
sources of income, rural households that get their income from wages and salaries and other 
rural households mainly including subsistence (self-sufficient) agriculture. In this paper, the 
effects on income distribution are studied in terms of changes in real income for the three 
poorest household groups in comparison to the corresponding changes for richer household 
groups.
59 The three groups with the lowest average income can be identified and these three 
groups are then subject to the targeted transfers in order to minimize the leakages to rich 
households. Having decided which households should be subject to targeted transfers, the 
total amount of transfers can be distributed among the low-average-income groups according 
to the number of households in each of the poor household groups, thereby ensuring that each 
household obtains an equal amount of transfer.
60 In this respect, my way of distributing the 
transfers to each chosen representative household group differs from a study of targeted 
                                                 
57 While general equilibrium modellers generally have shown little interest in distributive impacts of policies, the 
standard CGE model developed by Löfgren et al. introduces the representative household approach, which has 
become the traditional way of involving distributive impacts in CGE-analysis. Other more recent approaches are, 
for example, the CGE-integrated multi-household approach and a micro-simulation sequential approach. 
However, these methods require more specific household data than what is currently available in the case of 
Namibia; see Boccanfuso (2007). 
58 The preliminary report of the Namibian HIES 2003/2004 only presents the main findings at an aggregated 
level. As the final report of the Namibian HIES 2003/2004 has not yet been published, there is unfortunately no 
updated household income and expenditure data available that can be added to this analysis. 
59 Naturally, the current division of household groups conceals some of the variations in income within rural 
sectors, but as about 70% of the poor live in rural areas and the remaining poor are to a large extent unemployed 
urban households (The World Bank Group: Poverty Monitoring Database), at least the majority within the three 
chosen household groups can be considered to be really poor.  
60 The general transfers are also distributed to all households according to the number of households in each 
household group. This is motivated by the fact that this is how real pensions or other transfer systems usually 
work: a fixed amount given to all households. 
  21versus unilateral transfers in the Zimbabwean economy by Chitiga (2000). The latter study 
also uses the representative household approach, but the transfers are only distributed 
according to the total original income of each group and not according to the number of 
households within each group.  
 
4.2.5. Elasticities 
Apart from the SAM, some additional data is needed to calibrate the model, mainly 
elasticities, depending on the chosen shape of the model equations of the production and 
consumption structure, which are further described in Appendix C. The elasticities of interest 
are trade elasticities, substitution elasticities between the factors of production and 
expenditure elasticities of market demand by households. Trade elasticities include the 
elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic output in domestic demand (the so-
called Armington-function) as well as the elasticity of transformation between exports and 
domestic demands for domestic marketed output (CET-function).
61 The substitution 
elasticities between factors of production are represented by a CES-function
62 and the 
expenditure elasticities by a linear expenditure system.
63 Concerning the expenditure 
elasticities for household energy demand (more specifically petroleum and electricity), these 
values are taken from an empirical study of Namibian energy demand by De Vita et al. 
(2006).
64 Since, to my knowledge, there are no other available empirical estimates of the 
required elasticities in Namibia, all other elasticity values are taken from a CGE model of the 
South African economy by Thurlow (2004).
65 This is motivated by the fact that the structure 
of the Namibian economy is similar to that of the South African economy. 
 
 
                                                 
61 See equations (22) and (23) in Appendix C for the functional relationship (represented by a CES-function) 
between imports and domestic output and equations (19) and (20) for the functional relationship (represented by 
a CET-function) between exports and domestic sales. Parameters ρc
t and ρc
q can be calibrated by including trade 
elasticities.
 
62 In Appendix C, the equation affected by the elasticity of factor substitution is equation (11), where ρa
va is 
calibrated. 
63 See equation (32) for the household demand function, where parameters γch  (subsistence quantity) and βch (the 
relative contribution of each commodity to utility after subsistence has been achieved) are calibrated using 
expenditure elasticities and a Frisch parameter.  
64 De Vita et al. estimate income- and price-elasticities of the Namibian energy demand by end users, both at the 
aggregated level and by type of energy (electricity, petrol and diesel), for the period 1980 to 2002. 
Unfortunately, this analysis does not include a sectoral analysis; i.e. it does not take into account that energy 
demand by different types of consumers might differ. 
65 These elasticities, in turn, are mainly based on empirical estimates for the South African economy. See 
Thurlow (2004) for a further discussion about elasticities. 
  225. Simulation scenarios 
 
The additional tax revenues raised via carbon taxation, lower water subsidies and rent taxation 
are combined with the different ways of recycling the tax revenues described above, thus 
resulting in five different scenarios. The environmental part of the fiscal reform includes an 
increase in the petroleum tax by about 30 per cent (following from the calculations of carbon 
contents described in section 4.2.3.), the introduction of a tax on the water use for the 
commercial agricultural sector and the private service sector of about 9 per cent 
(corresponding to the total amount of N$ 15 million which is the recorded amount of the 
current water subsidies among these sectors) and an increase in the direct tax on the fish 
factor of production from the current level of about 20 per cent to a case of total governmental 
capture of fish rent, i.e. the tax being 100 per cent of total fish rents. As this is a pure rent tax 
in the model, it will have no significant effect on the level of fish production, only on the 
distribution of fish factor income. As the main problem in Namibian fisheries currently seems 
to be a high pressure of new entries into the industry, the purpose of this policy would be to 
prevent new entries as well as force inefficient companies to exit by reducing the profits made 
within the industry. This will help secure a sustainable long-run fish stock. However, given 
the static model to which I have access, it is not possible to capture possible effects on entry.  
 
Concerning the choice of total governmental rent capture, it can be argued that, since the 
actual size of this rent is generally associated with a high degree of uncertainty, total rent 
capture is too risky a policy objective. The Namibian fisheries accounts are based on the UN 
System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA), which has also been 
used to construct fish accounts in a number of other countries including, for example, 
Norway, Iceland and the Philippines. In the calculations of rent, the only figure required (that 
is not provided by the national accounts) is the opportunity cost (rate of return) of fixed 
capital. In Namibia, a 20 per cent return is used in order to reflect the high risk associated 
with fishing activities.
66 This rather high rate of return, together with the fact that rent 
calculations are based on realised and not potential rents that could have been realised without 
inefficiencies like over-capacity, should reduce the risk of an over-estimation of the fish rents. 
However, as the model does not capture any possible effects on entry and exit, it might still be 
                                                 
66 This rate is higher than the return used in other countries (Norway 7% and the Philippines 10-15%) and also 
higher than the 10% rate used for calculating the value of minerals in Namibia.  
 
  23argued that the tax revenues from a 100 per cent profit tax may be overestimated and 
therefore, a sensitivity analysis has been conducted for the case of 50 per cent rent capturing. 
The results of this sensitivity analysis are presented in Appendix E. 
 
In total, the environmental fiscal revenues amount to about 1-2 per cent of total GDP, 
suggesting that the environmental fiscal reform will only create minor changes in the structure 
of the economy. The contents of the five different scenarios are shown in table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Simulation Scenarios 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Environmental taxes (fish, energy and water) x x x x x
Recycling alternatives:
 - Decreasing the commodity sales tax rate  x
 - Decreasing the commodity sales tax rate on food x
 - Subsidizing unskilled labour x
 - Increasing (general) transfers to all households x
 - Increasing (targeted) transfers to poor households x  
 
In scenario 1, the tax revenues are recycled through cuts in the commodity tax rate while in 
scenario 2, only the commodity taxes on food are decreased. In scenario, 3 the environmental 
tax revenues are used to introduce a subsidy of unskilled labour. In scenarios 4 and 5, direct 
governmental transfers to households are introduced, first through an increase in the transfers 
to all households, i.e. general transfers, and then by targeted transfers to the poorest household 
groups only. 
 
6. Simulation results  
 
6.1. Environmental effects 
 
Although the environmental benefits of fish rent taxation, which constitutes the main part of 
the environmental fiscal reform in this paper, are not measurable in the context of the model, 
it is interesting to note that in terms of total CO2 emissions and water use, all scenarios will 
lead to decreased CO2-emissions, while the water use will slightly increase in all scenarios 
except the transfer scenarios. The total change in the consumption of petroleum products and 
water is shown in table 3 below.  
 
  24Table 3. Consumption of petroleum products and water 
Percentage change as compared to base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
 (household and intermediate demand)
Total consumption of petroleum products -0.73 -1.05 -0.01 -1.22 -1.61
Total consumption of water 0.23 0.13 0.75 -0.15 -0.31
 
 
The decrease in total CO2-emissions is mainly a result of decreased household demand for 
petroleum products in the economy. From table 3, it is clear that the scenarios where the tax 
revenues are recycled through direct transfers to households, followed by the scenario where 
taxes on food are reduced, are the most efficient in terms of reducing CO2-emissions. It is 
interesting to note that in scenario 3, there is only a minor decrease in the consumption of 
petroleum products. The main reason is the relatively high increase in total production in this 
scenario as compared to the others. However, despite the correlation between the change in 
petroleum product consumption and the change in the overall production level in the 
economy
67, this does not fully explain the differences between scenarios; while for example 
scenarios 1 and 2 achieve almost the same positive effect on overall GDP
68, scenario 2 (food 
tax reduction) reduces petroleum consumption, and thereby CO2-emissions, more than 
scenario 1 (overall commodity tax cuts).  
  
The reason why total water use increases is partly because the removal of water subsidies 
only constitutes a small share of the fiscal reform and partly because the model does not allow 
for a high rate of substitution between intermediates, thus implying that water use will closely 
follow the change in total production. 
 
6.2. Effects on production, employment and income inequality 
 
In this section, results concerning the potential non-environmental additional benefits from 
the environmental fiscal reform are presented. As unemployment together with the skewed 
income distribution are two important characteristics of the Namibian economy, it is 
interesting to evaluate the policies in terms of changes in these measures. In addition, the 
                                                 
67 See section 6.2.1. and table 4 below for the effects on the real GDP-level in each scenario. The transfer 
scenarios give significant environmental benefits, but this comes at the cost of reduced real GDP. The 
environmental benefit in the scenario where unskilled labour is subsidized is less significant, but one reason for 
this is that the economy grows the most in this scenario.  
68 See table 4 below for the effects on the real GDP-level. 
  25overall effect on GDP is also of interest. Therefore, the variables considered in this section are 
the real GDP, the employment of unskilled labour and the real consumption by the poorest 
household groups in relation to the real consumption by richer households. The effects on 
these variables are summarized for all scenarios in table 4 below. The results for other key 
variables are shown in Appendix E. 
 
Table 4. Effects on target variables 
Percentage change as compared to base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Effect on real GDP 0.19 0.17 0.49 -0.03 -0.04
Effect on employment for unskilled labour 0.53 0.42 1.47 -0.10 -0.16
Change in real consumption:
                  - among the poorest households 0.53 1.03 1.23 0.74 1.96
                  - among the richer households 0.27 -0.20 0.88 -0.88 -2.07
 
 
6.2.1. Real GDP  and employment 
Scenario 3 leads to the largest increases in real GDP and employment among unskilled 
labour. While increased environmental taxes raise the production costs and, in turn, reduce the 
demand for unskilled labour
69, the subsidization of unskilled labour decreases the production 
costs and thereby increases the demand for unskilled labour. As the positive recycling effect 
more than offsets the first negative effect on overall production levels, the result of this 
scenario is a significant increase in employment of unskilled labour as well as real GDP. This 
result is intuitive as the subsidy is directed towards unskilled labour only (which is the factor 
that is unemployed), while the environmental tax to a large extent falls on one of the fixed 
factors, fish, without any significant negative effect on production in the model.  
 
A positive effect on real GDP and employment can also be achieved by reducing commodity 
taxes, as in scenarios 1 and 2. The main reason is that overall commodity prices fall, leading 
to a fall also in the cost of employing unskilled labour (as the unskilled labour wage − paid by 
firms − is tied to the CPI) and thereby an increase in employment of unskilled labour, which 
                                                 
69 As the model does not allow for substitution between different intermediate inputs, the production costs 
increase along with the increasing costs of petroleum and water inputs. The production levels are reduced and 
there is a decrease in the demand for factors of production. 
  26is seen in table 3 above.
70 The positive effect on GDP is larger when the tax revenues are 
recycled through cuts in all commodity taxes than when only food taxes are cut, although the 
difference is relatively small.
71  
 
The effect on real GDP in scenarios 4 and 5 is negative; in fact, the increase in direct 
governmental transfers to households does not have the positive effect on real GDP and 
employment as do indirect and direct tax cuts/subsidies. The main reason is that there is no 
direct effect on costs of production and also, more importantly, no direct effect on the 
unskilled labour wage from increasing governmental transfers. Therefore, the negative effect 
on GDP and employment resulting from increased environmental taxes is not offset by this 
recycling option. Using the tax revenues to increase governmental transfers, the structure of 
economic activity is only affected through the changes in demand patterns among household 
groups. The more the transfers are directed to rural households, the larger is the negative 
effect on employment and GDP. The reason is that when increasing the income of poor − 
mainly rural, agricultural households − relatively more agricultural products and food are 
demanded in the economy. The prices of these products increase, mobile factors like labour 
move to these more profitable sectors, and the prices of fixed factors within these sectors 
increase. At the same time, in the service sectors, there is a decrease in production along with 
the price of sector-specific factors, thus explaining the decreased factor income for 
households relying on these factors (especially richer household groups) and this is the reason 
why the total effect on demand is negative. In this specific case, as agricultural production is 
less labour intensive than the service sectors, the result of this redistribution of production is 
increased unemployment in the economy. The reason why this result holds also in the case of 
general transfers to all households is that the transfers are distributed according to the number 
                                                 
70 The fall in overall commodity prices also affects the cost of intermediate inputs, so that the overall costs of 
production decrease, but the decrease in the unskilled labour wage is the main driving force behind the increased 
employment and production levels throughout the economy. 
71 These results can be compared to the results of the South African studies by Van Heerden et. al. (2006). In the 
South African studies, where environmental tax revenues were recycled through a food tax break, a general tax 
break on all commodities or a decrease in the factor taxes on capital and labour, the food tax break was shown to 
be the only recycling option resulting in a positive effect on GDP. One explanation as to why there seems to be 
more scope for positive GDP-effects in this study is that the tax on fish rents is non-distortionary. The reason 
why the subsidy of unskilled labour performs so well in terms of employment and GDP-effects is that the whole 
subsidy is directly directed towards the unemployed factor; in the South African study, factor taxes were equally 
reduced on capital, skilled and unskilled labour (unskilled labour only contributes about 14% to total factor 
income). The reason why a reduction of the taxes on all commodities increases GDP and employment more than 
a reduction of food taxes only, which is contrary to the case in the South African model, is that, in Namibia, food 
production is less labour intensive than, for example, the service sector. However, this might be due to the 
problem of distinguishing factor income within the agricultural sectors; see section 4.2. concerning the “mixed 
factor” in the agricultural sectors. 
  27of households in each group. While there is a greater number of poor households, these as a 




6.2.2. Distribution of real consumption changes among rich and poor households 
When it comes to real consumption
73 by all households, the total effect is positive for 
scenarios 1, 2 and 3, where the increase is largest in scenario 3. However, for scenarios 4 and 
5, there is a slight decrease in total real consumption of all households. Turning to the change 
in real consumption among the three poorest household groups only, it is clear that the effect 
is positive for all scenarios. If only looking at the total increase in real consumption by the 
poorest households, scenario 5 is subject to the largest increase, followed by scenarios 3, 2, 4 
and 1.  
 
However, in terms of income distribution, it might be more interesting to study how 
consumption by the three poorest household groups is changed as compared to that of richer 
households. If the richer household groups benefit as much – or relatively more – than the 
poorest groups, the current gap between the rich and the poor in Namibia would remain or 
even increase. According to the model results, it is clear that all five scenarios will actually 
decrease the current gap between rich and poor households.
74 In scenarios 4 and 5, where 
governmental direct transfers to households are increased, the differences between real 
consumption changes for rich and poor households are most significant. In scenario 5, where 
the transfers are concentrated to the three poorest household groups only, the real 
consumption of these three household groups increases significantly while it decreases for all 
other groups. This scenario gives the most significant effect on income distribution in terms 
of decreasing the gap between rich and poor households, followed by the scenario with 
general transfers to all households. The reason why poor households benefit more than rich 
households in the transfer scenarios is that poor households constitute a significant share of 
the total number of households. As a group, poorer households will receive a greater amount 
of total transfers than richer households. The direct effect is that the poor households will use 
                                                 
72 Interesting to note is that if the transfers were designed to only target rich urban households instead of all or 
only poor (rural) households, demand for services would increase in relation to agricultural and food products, 
resulting in the reverse impacts and a small positive GDP- and employment effect in the economy.  
73 Real consumption is equal to real disposable income.  
74 It is interesting to note that increased environmental taxes on fish rents, energy and water will mainly affect 
the richer household groups, thus implying that even without recycling the environmental tax revenues, a 
redistribution effect can be achieved. However, recycling of the revenues reinforces the redistribution of income 
(in terms of reducing the gap between rich and poor households). 
  28their transfer incomes to increase their consumption, especially of agricultural products, 
which leads to an increase in production in these sectors which, in turn, also indirectly affects 
the income of poor rural households as they are mainly employed within the agricultural 
sectors. At the same time, production decreases within service sectors and households 
depending on factor income from the sector-specific factors within these sectors (mainly 
richer households) will be subject to a loss of factor income as the prices of these factors 
decrease. This, together with a slightly increased price level throughout the economy, actually 
results in a negative effect on total real household consumption. This implies that while 
unilateral as well as targeted transfers seem to ensure that the poorest household groups will 
be better off, these benefits come at the cost of making richer households significantly less 
well off as compared to the base situation. 
 
Comparing scenarios 1 and 2, where commodity taxes are cut, the difference between the 
consumption changes of poor and rich households is greater in scenario 2, thus implying that 
by reducing the commodity sales taxes on food only, it is possible to achieve a more equal 
income distribution than in the case of general commodity sales tax cuts. In fact, scenario 2 is 
the second most redistributive scenario (after scenario 5) considering the targeting of poor 
households. However, this also comes at the cost of decreased real income for richer 
households, although not as significant as in the transfer scenarios. The mechanisms behind 
these results are a general decrease in the price level followed by increased demand and 
production levels in the economy. When only food taxes are cut, poor households benefit 
relatively more as they spend a greater share of their income on these products. This also has 
the effect of slightly redistributing the production structure in favour of agricultural products 
in relation to the service sectors. This is the reason why richer households as a group become 
worse off in scenario 2, as compared to scenario 1.   
 
Regarding scenario 3, which gives the most significant effect on total real household 
consumption, the redistribution profile is less significant in comparison with scenarios 2, 4 
and 5. The reasons why scenarios 3 and 1 do not have a strong redistribution effect are that 
especially the household group “urban wage and salary”, which is the largest of the three 
richer household groups, benefit relatively more in scenarios 1 and 3 than in other scenarios. 
This is due to the fact that urban households demand relatively more of other commodities 
than food, thus explaining the positive effect on urban households in scenario 1 and this 
  29household group also owns a great deal of unskilled labour, which means that it will benefit 




The purpose of this paper was to find out whether different forms of recycling of revenues 
from environmental taxation of fish rents, energy and water could give rise to additional 
benefits in terms of GDP, employment and income distribution to the Namibian economy. 
Concerning the environmental effects, the results show that while water consumption, to a 
large extent, seems to follow the economy-wide changes in production, the consumption of 
petroleum products, and thereby CO2-emissions, decreases for all scenarios irrespective of the 
direction of the overall production level (although the decrease in CO2-emissions is low in the 
scenario where unskilled labour is subsidized). The results also show that for some of the 
recycling options, there is some scope for additional, non-environmental benefits. Therefore, 
an environmental fiscal reform should be considered as an interesting option for policymakers 
in Namibia when deciding how to ensure a more sustainable and equitable future for the 
country. However, the way in which the tax revenues should be redistributed needs to be 
carefully examined as the economy-wide effects of each recycling option will most likely 
differ.  
 
It is interesting to note that according to the results, environmental taxes might not necessarily 
be regressive in nature; the increased taxes on fish rents and energy together with decreased 
subsidies of water will mainly affect richer households. Although all recycling options 
considered in this analysis reinforce the redistribution of income in terms of reducing the gap 
between rich and poor households, the degree of this redistribution differs across recycling 
options. It is clear that while using the additional revenues to subsidize unskilled labour gives 
the largest effects on real GDP and total change in real consumption by all households, this 
might not necessarily be the first choice for reducing CO2-emissions as well as reducing the 
gap between rich and poor households. Another interesting option for using the additional 
revenues to achieve both an increase in GDP and a more equal income distribution would be 
to decrease the taxes on food. The reason why this scenario performs better from the point of 
view of reducing the income gap between rich and poor households is that food constitutes a 
significant share of poor households’ total expenditures. These results provide further 
  30evidence of the idea that in developing countries, poverty is not only a question of 
employment: although the employment effect is roughly the same when reducing general 
commodity taxes and taxes on food only, the latter performs significantly better in targeting 
poor households. However, it is important to consider the risk of making the richer 
households significantly worse off. Furthermore, as household data in the current SAM is 
based on the income and expenditure survey from 1993/94, which is quite old and does not 
allow for a high level of disaggregation between different household groups, a more detailed 
data-set for the households would be necessary to make a more rigorous analysis of the 
poverty implications of potential environmental fiscal reforms in Namibia. Although the 
inclusion of rent taxation (which was feasible through a relatively well-developed system of 
Natural Resource Accounting in Namibia) is an important contribution of this study, further 
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 Appendix A – Namibian Social Accounting Matrix 2002 (million N$ in current prices) 







P7 Meat processing 0
P8 Fish processing 0
P9 grain milling 0
P10 Bev and other food prod 0
P11 Textiles 0
P12 Light Manufacturing 0
P13 Petroleum Products 0




P18 Trade. Repairs 0
P19 Hotels and Restaurants 0
P20 Transport 0
P21 Communication 0
P22 Finance and Insurance 0
P23 Real Estate, own 0
P24 Mkt Real Est/bus service 0
P25 Other private services 0
P26 Government services 0
P27 direct purch.abroad by res 0
P28 Dom purch. by non res 0
P29 TradeandTransport-margin 77 34 7 0 0 0 110 17 163 405 371 814 1226 1270 0 0 0 -4493 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
P30 CIF/FOB adjustment -1114 -125 1238 -1
Subtotal 77 34 7 0 0 0 110 17 163 405 371 814 1226 1270 0 0 0 -4493 0 -1114 0 -125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1238 0
A1 ComCereal 63 63
A2 ComOtherCrops 303 303
A3 Commercial Livestock 1396 153 1549
A4 Traditional Agriculture 398 398
A5 Fishing 696 1938 2634
A6 Mining 7322 7322
A7 Meat processing 1070 1070
A8 Fish processing 1265 1265
A9 grain milling 755 755
A10 Bev and other food prod 2657 2657
A11 Textiles 143 143
A12 Light Manufacturing 929 929
A13 Heavy Manufacturing 1038 1038
A14 Electricity 747 747
A15 Water 557 557
A16 Construction 2681 2681
A17 Trade/Repairs 5150 5150
A18 Hotels and Restaurants 1440 1440
A19 Transport 2939 2939
A20 Communication 1197 1197
A21 Finance and insurance 1890 1890
A22 Real Estate, own 1470 1470
A23 Mkt Real Est/business 2374 2374
A24 Other private services 1520 1520
A25 Government services 8468 8468
A26 Tourism-nonresidents 2377 2377
Subtotal 63 303 1396 551 696 7322 1070 3203 755 2657 143 929 0 1038 747 557 2681 5150 1440 2939 1197 1890 1470 2374 1520 8468 0 2377 0 0 52936
F1 Skilled Labour 0
F2 Unskilled Labour 0
F3 Mixed Income, Com Agr 0
F4 Mixed Income, Trad Agr 0
F5 NOS 0
Subtotal 0
I1 Urban - Wage/Salery 0
I2 Urban - Farm/business 0
I3 Urban - other 0
I4 Rural - Wage/Salery 0
I5 Rural - ComAgr/Business 0
I6 Rural - subsistence/other 0
I7 NPISH 0
I8 Enterprises 0
I9 Government 2 10 9 0 0 358 96 15 117 647 224 336 268 475 0 0 0 11 187 0 0 0 0 57 4 0 0 0 0 0 2816
Subtotal 2 10 9 0 0 358 96 15 117 647 224 336 268 475 0 0 0 11 187 0 0 0 0 57 4 0 0 0 0 0 2816
K1 Saving 0
R1 Imports 290 140 31 0 5 402 166 0 287 867 823 3281 1515 6148 34 0 193 0 0 972 2 138 0 576 0 0 684 0 0 -1238 15316
TOTAL 432 487 1443 551 701 8082 1442 3235 1322 4576 1561 5360 3009 8931 781 557 2874 668 1627 2797 1199 1903 1470 3007 1524 8468 684 2377 0 0 71068A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A20 A21 A22 A23 A24 A25 A26 Subtotal
P1 ComCereal 3 2 1 344 83 433
P2 ComOtherCrops 0 11 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 3 16 1 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 1 6 3 24 137
P3 ComAnimalProd 0 0 14 10 0 0 725 0 0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 882
P4 FoodforOwnCons 0
P5 Fishing 452 452
P6 Mining 881 16 211 89 7 1 3 9 1217
P7 Meat processing 1 82 13 102 1 2 5 7 48 261
P8 Fish processing 12 81 2 4 4 5
P9 grain milling 1 7 1 73 43 1 2 4 27 159
P10 Bev and other food prod 113 1 12 4 584 11 261 23 3 17 61 95 1185
P11 Textiles 2 2 1 2 47 21 1 34 9 3 15 9 2 9 11 24 192
P12 Light Manufacturing 7 22 41 2 175 166 17 13 6 246 11 358 46 10 20 326 420 40 243 34 255 0 138 216 195 71 3078
P13 Petroleum Products 4 2 43 4 296 332 3 6 5 22 0 7 15 4 7 116 61 10 568 22 15 0 30 26 59 119 1776
P14 Heavy Manufacturing 2 4 32 26 349 672 4 17 2 202 4 32 135 94 18 1165 67 25 284 88 19 0 65 93 391 0 3790
P15 Electricity 0 5 21 0 0 100 4 3 5 14 1 7 38 40 13 8 30 32 49 11 15 0 8 16 190 12 622
P16 Water 1 1 2 4 0 6 1 1 0 10 0 1 1 0 161 5 8 14 16 2 6 0 10 8 224 12 494
P17 Construction 1 66 4 37 0 9 0 48 11 42 0 218
P18 Trade. Repairs 37 6 14 9 21 2 8 6 0 0 9 163 1 100 40 16 0 43 25 46 0 546
P19 Hotels and Restaurants 9 2 28 1 61 0 5 0 20 24 163 951 1264
P20 Transport 0 34 16 1 0 92 52 27 29 296 10 89 51 2 7 61 283 9 106 46 73 0 93 55 588 713 2733
P21 Communication 0 1 13 0 10 4 3 3 2 14 2 13 7 4 2 45 320 10 88 188 58 0 95 61 52 71 1066
P22 Finance and Insurance 1 3 49 0 49 30 8 9 1 57 3 19 18 3 10 68 271 12 241 6 72 0 166 36 67 24 1223
P23 Real Estate, own 0
P24 Mkt Real Est/bus service 0 2 20 0 139 418 7 2 20 20 1 11 19 21 18 87 284 25 98 13 198 0 104 86 115 71 1779
P25 Other private services 4 2 14 21 2 12 7 0 0 6 4 1 12 1 6 0 6 4 71 119 292
P26 Government services 32 1 1 2 9 0 3 2 0 0 11 32 0 11 1 19 0 7 16 70 0 217
P27 direct purch.abroad by res 18 58 2 1 4 8 1 0 2 0 0 21 0 14 19 2 35 0 14 0 45 0 244
P28 Dom purch. by non res 0
P29 TradeandTransport-margin 0
P30 CIF/FOB adjustment 0
Subtotal 18 89 369 51 1036 2839 939 568 445 1803 87 613 560 179 256 2051 2057 696 1980 463 801 0 858 724 2445 2378 24305
A1 ComCereal 0
A2 ComOtherCrops 0
A3 Commercial Livestock 0
A4 Traditional Agriculture 0
A5 Fishing 0
A6 Mining 0
A7 Meat processing 0
A8 Fish processing 0
A9 grain milling 0
A10 Bev and other food prod 0
A11 Textiles 0
A12 Light Manufacturing 0





A18 Hotels and Restaurants 0
A19 Transport 0
A20 Communication 0
A21 Finance and insurance 0
A22 Real Estate, own 0
A23 Mkt Real Est/business 0
A24 Other private services 0
A25 Government services 0
A26 Tourism-nonresidents 0
S u b t o t a l 0000000 0000 0000 000000000 00 0
F1 Skilled Labour 1 7 25 0 352 433 22 81 21 78 11 61 80 80 57 159 521 66 223 175 94 0 132 517 1512 4708
F2 Unskilled Labour 3 36 129 6 371 457 27 99 26 96 15 75 58 99 70 58 549 166 462 123 70 0 87 203 3499 6784
F3 Mixed Income, Com Agr 31 127 771 929
F4 Mixed Income, Trad Agr 340 340
F5 NOS 655 2907 73 447 229 560 27 164 296 196 88 202 1792 457 16 27 751 1405 1042 106 0 11440
Subtotal 35 170 925 346 1378 3797 122 627 276 734 53 300 434 375 215 419 2862 689 701 325 915 1405 1261 826 5011 0 24201
I1 Urban - Wage/Salery 0
I2 Urban - Farm/business 0
I3 Urban - other 0
I4 Rural - Wage/Salery 0
I5 Rural - ComAgr/Business 0
I6 Rural - subsistence/other 0
I7 NPISH 0
I8 Enterprises 0
I 9 G o v e r n m e n t  0040 1 5 2 1 21 3050 - 1 1000 7 3 3770 3 6 6 6 6 5 - 5 6 0 3 3 1
S u b t o t a l 0040 1 5 2 1 21 3050 - 1 1000 7 3 3770 3 6 6 6 6 5 - 5 6 00 3 3 1
K1 Saving 9 43 251 0 68 675 11 69 35 116 4 25 45 192 86 202 195 50 250 410 138 0 191 27 1012 4104
R1 Imports 0
TOTAL 62 302 1549 397 2634 7323 1073 1267 756 2658 144 927 1039 746 557 2679 5147 1442 2938 1198 1890 1471 2375 1521 8468 2378 52941F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 subtotal I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 Subtotal K1 R1 TOTAL
Cereal 0 432
OtherCrops 33 7 5 11 3 41 0 0 100 251 487
AnimalProd 37 5 6 22 31 23 0 124 -195 632 1443
dforOwnCons 0 0 0 55 0 496 551 0 0 551
ishing 0 0 250 702
0 -163 7026 8082
t processing 244 37 35 107 27 203 653 0 530 1443
h processing 21 4 5 9 4 39 82 3108 3235
illing 100 15 25 147 59 759 1105 60 1323
ev and other food prod 645 110 89 443 115 1124 2526 863 4575
extiles 508 95 28 196 50 421 1298 71 1561
ight Manufacturing 997 168 177 236 94 333 2005 22 254 5360
etroleum Products 594 86 36 156 189 171 1232 0 3008
eavy Manufacturing 558 136 56 414 70 521 0 1755 2850 536 8931
lectricity 91 21 10 13 0 19 0 154 5 781
ater 43 9 5 1 0 2 60 557
onstruction 74 9 2 11 5 21 122 2640 16 2875
rade. Repairs 181 80 8 47 3 44 0 363 668
otels and Restaurants 30 5 2 9 1 17 0 64 1627
ransport 52 16 6 9 6 1 90 2797
ommunication 537 20 21 71 7 8 0 664 42 1199
inance and Insurance 878 183 107 93 41 168 1470 16 1903
eal Estate, own 253 26 174 100 56 18 0 627 0 1470
kt Real Est/bus service 125 29 16 24 41 40 958 1233 558 44 3007
ther private services 108 19 6 30 18 23 0 204 1524
overnment services 339 59 0 34 10 0 0 8045 8487 8468
irect purch.abroad by res 0 2 684
om purch. by non res 0 2377 2377
radeandTransport-margin 00
IF/FOB adjustment 00


















otels and Restaurants 1440
ransport 2939
ommunication 1197
inance and insurance 1890
eal Estate, own 1470
kt Real Est/business 2374
ther private services 1520
overnment services 8468
ourism-nonresidents 2377
btotal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52939
illed Labour 4751
killed Labour 6783
ixed Income, Com Agr 930
ixed Income, Trad Agr 340
13200
btotal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26003
ban - Wage/Salery 3759 3383 7142 2000 2000 9142
ban - Farm/business 39 154 193 1500 1500 1693
ban - other 524 524 7 2 3 3 250 73 338 862
 Wage/Salery 824 824 1648 1200 1200 2848
 ComAgr/Business 58 0 775 833 500 500 1333
 subsistence/other 2052 340 2392 95 25 0 45 40 950 984 2139 4531
73 73 11 3 1 5 5 15 417 428 885 958
terprises 11689 11689 831 831 12520
ernment 0 1618 17 40 369 26 23 1931 4024 3072 10245
btotal 4680 6783 929 340 11762 24494 1731 47 41 423 73 38 0 8748 2316 13417 0 3072 44132
ving 961 510 2 187 430 2 0 3771 -560 5303 -3693 5715
ports 72 1438 1510 444 444 17268













































































TAppendix B – Adjustments of the SAM-data 
 
Agricultural sector data 
Some necessary small adjustments in the SAM have been made for the traditional agricultural 
sector. In the original SAM, the traditional agricultural sector produces an “own” commodity 
called “traditional commodity”, which can be described as “food for own consumption”; this 
is largely cereal crop production. However, for modelling purposes, it is important that food 
produced in the traditional agricultural sector could be substituted for food purchased from 
elsewhere. Therefore, the “traditional commodity” has been redefined; it is assumed that the 
traditional sector produces crops (mainly cereals) that are replaceable either by crops 
produced elsewhere in the country or by imported crops. Some adjustments have also been 
made with regard to the distribution of factor income in the traditional agricultural sector in 
the SAM. In the traditional agricultural sector, the mixed factor category includes land rents 
and income generated by labour supplied by people informally employed in the sector. By 
recognizing the approximate number of informal workers in the subsistence agricultural 
sector (see Angula and Sherbourne 2003) together with an estimate of the mean rural informal 
wage (see Humavindu 2007), part of the total mixed income in the traditional sector can be 
transformed into factor income for unskilled workers.  For the purposes of this study (where 
any effects on the demand for unskilled labour will be important for the distribution of 
income as well as total income in the economy), this small adjustment represents a better way 
of modelling the factor income distribution in the traditional agricultural sector.  
 
Tourism data 
Due to lack of data, a full representation of tourism was not possible at the time of 
development of the SAM. Therefore, tourism is treated as a “dummy sector” in the current 
SAM, which is a way of pointing out the importance of an activity which does not correspond 
to an actual industry. This dummy sector corresponds to the total value of “the purchase of 
products in the Namibian economy by non-residents”, which was found in the national 
accounts.
75 However, in the CGE-model, activities without factor inputs are not allowed, so 
this dummy sector had to be eliminated from the original SAM for the data to fit the model. 
This was simply done by directly treating the values of purchases by foreign tourists for each 
commodity as “exports”. Due to the lack of specific data for the tourism sector, a reasonable 
                                                 
75 Lange et al. (2004). analysis of raising taxes within this industry is not feasible. In addition, in contrast to the fish 
sector data described above, there are no available estimations in the natural resource 
accounts for “rents” on wildlife. Therefore, the tourism sector is not included in the 
environmental tax reform studied in this paper.
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Appendix C – Mathematical statement of the model 
 




Import price:      
() ∑
∈
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =
CT c
c c c c c c icm PQ EXR tm pwm PM
'
' ' 1    (1) 
Export price:    
() ∑
∈
⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ =
CT c
c c c c c c ice PQ EXR te pwe PE
'
' ' 1    (2) 





c c c c c icd PQ PDS PDD
'
' '      (3) 
Absorption:  
() ( c c c c c c c QM PM QD PDD QQ tq PQ ) ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ 1    (4) 
Marketed output value: 
c c c c c c QE PE QD PDS QX PX ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅      (5) 





ac ac a PXAC PA θ      (6) 





ca c a ica PQ PINTA      (7) 
Activity revenue and costs: 
                                                 
76 Since the tourism sector represents a significant part of the Namibian economy and since it is highly 
dependent on the quality and sustainability of wildlife, this industry is an interesting target for future 
environmental taxation. Therefore, I have simulated a variant of the model, where an approximate tax level in 
the “hotel and restaurant sector” (one important tourism sector) is introduced. However, as this extension did not 
affect the directions of any results, I decided not to include the simulation of this extended model in the paper, 
since the tourism data is not reliable. 
  40a a a a a a a QINTA PINTA QVA PVA QA ta PA ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ ) 1 (  (8) 
Consumer price index: 
∑
∈
⋅  = 
C c 
c  c  cwts  PQ  CPI 
     (9) 
Producer price index for nontraded market output: 




c c dwts PDS DPI
 
Production and Trade block 
 

























⋅ ⋅ = ∑    (11) 
Leontief technology: demand for aggregate value added: 
a a a QA iva QVA ⋅ =        (12) 
Leontief technology: demand for aggregate intermediate input:  
  a a a QA a QINTA ⋅ = int        (13) 
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QF QF
QVA tva PVA WFDIST WF
ρ ρ
α δ α δ
   (14) 
Disaggregated intermediate input demand: 
a ca ca QINTA ica QINT ⋅ =      (15) 
Commodity production and allocation:         
a ac ac QA QXAC ⋅ =θ        (16) 
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ac c c ac QXAC QXAC QX PX PXAC
ρ ρ δ δ  (18) 
Output transformation (CET) function:  















c c QD QE QX ρ δ δ α
1
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     (20) 
Output transformation for non-exported commodities: 
c c c QE QD QX + =      (21) 














c c QD QM QQ ρ ρ ρ δ δ α
1
1
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     (23) 
Composite supply for non-imported outputs and non-produced imports: 
       (24)  c c c QM QD QQ + =
Demand for transactions services: 
() ∑
∈
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =
' '
' ' ' ' ' '
C c









fa fa f if QF WFDIST WF YF      (26) 
After tax real wage rate (WFAT is held fixed for the factor unskilled labour): 
CPI tf WF WFAT f f f / ) 1 ( − ⋅ =      (27) 
Institutional factor incomes: 
  ( ) [ ] EXR trnsfr YF tf shif YIF rowf if f if if ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ = 1      (28) 
   
Income of domestic nongovernment institutions: 
    (29) 




f  i i  ⋅ + ⋅ + +  =  ∑  ∑
∈  ∈  ' ' 
'
Intra-institutional transfers: 
  42' ' ' ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 ( i i i i i i i YI tins MPS shii TRII ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ =    (30) 
Household consumption expenditure: 
( ) ( ) h h h
INSDNG  i 
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− ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ ∑
∈
h c c h ch h c c h c c PQ EH PQ QH PQ ' 'γ β γ    (32) 
Investment demand: 
       (33)  c c qinv IADJ QINV ⋅ =
Government consumption demand:  
GADJ qg QG c c ⋅ =      (34) 
Government revenue:  
∑ ∑ ∑
∈∈ ∈
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =
INSDNG iA a
a a a f
F f
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C c
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    ∑
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⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +
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row gov f gov EXR trnsf YF  (35)




⋅ + ⋅ =
C c INSDNG
gov i c c CPI trnsfr QG PQ EG
1
   (36) 
 
System constraint block 
 
Factor market (factor supply and demand can be fixed/flexible depending on the factor 





f fa QFS QF      (37) 
 
Composite commodity markets: 
c
A aH h




Current account balance for rest of the world: 
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   (39) 
Government balance: 
+      (40) 
Institutional savings rate:  
mps DMPS mps MPSADJ 01 01 1
EG YG = GSAV
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Symbol   Explanation 
=





c cwts   weight of commodity c in the CPI         import price (foreign currency)  c pwm  
c dwts   weight of commodity c in the          
 
                 t  
        producer price index   
c qg     base year quantity of governmen
                   demand 
ca ica quantity of c as interm                  ediate input  
          
f private 
   
c qinv   quantity o
                per unit of activity a  investment  demand
' cc icd   quantity of commodity c as trade
   
                       
n i in  
        
if shif   share for domestic institutio
input per unit of   c’ produced and 
     sold domestically 
 income of factor f 
' cc ice   quantity of commodity c as trade    
                        
 of i’ to i      
                            input per exported unit of c’      
' ii shii   share of net income
                        
' cc icm   quantity of commodity c as trade  
                     
tivity a  a tα   tax rate of ac
       input per exported unit of c’  
a a int   quantity of aggregate intermediate  
                     
 export  tax  rate 
         input per activity unit        
c te
a iva   quantity of value added per activity   
                     
           direct tax rate for factor f  
                         unit       
f tf
                               
i mps   base savi e fo ngs rat r domestic   
                       
 direct tax rate for      
          
i tins                  exogenous
     institutions                   domestic institution i    
i mps01   0-1 parameter with 1 for institutions  
                      
                       
institutions 
                        
i tins01   0-1 parameter with 1 for 
      with potentially flexed direct tax  
     rates 
    with potentially flexed tax rate 
c pwe   export price (foreign currency)                    c tm            Import tariff rate                        
    
rate of value added tax for activity a      
                        
a tva  
                      
Source: Löfgren
 
 et al. (2002). 
  44Symbol   Explanation 
reek symbols 




a parameter in the CES 
                        
Armington function share parameter  α   Efficiency 
    activity function   
q
c δ  
va
a α   Efficiency parame    ter in the CES   
 
CES value-added function share 
  value added function   
va
fa δ  
parameter   
ac
c α                    estic  




c δ   CET function share parame Shift parameter for dom
                  commodity aggregation function  activity  function 
q
c α   Armington function shift paramet ch γ   Subsistence consumption of marketed 
        
er
   commodity c for household h    
ac θ  
t
c α   CET function shift parameter  Yield of output of c per unit of     
                             activity a                      
ch β  
a
a n exponent  ρ   CES production functio Marginal share of consumption   
                          c          spending on marketed commodity
                          for household h  
a
a tion share   
                     
CES value added function exponent 
 
δ   CES activity func
       parameter         
va
a ρ  
ac
ac  for domestic     
                           
         Domestic commodity aggregation  
              
δ   Share parameter
    commodity aggregation function 
ac
c ρ  
              function exponent                   
q
c ρ   Armington function exponent 
t
c ρ                     CET function exponent 
Source: Löfgren
ymbol     Explanation 
ndogenous variables  
Symbol     Explanation 





DMPS  Change in domestic institution  
 
Demand price for commodity  
   
c PDD  
produced and sold domestically savings 
DPI   Producer price index for  
  put            ly  domestically  marketed  out     
c PDS   Supply price of commodity  
      produced and sold domestical
EG  Government  expenditures  c PE   Export price (domestic currency) 
h EH   Consumption spending for  
    household  h 
a PINTA   Aggregate intermediate input  
price for activity a  
EXR   Exchange rate (LCU per unit of FCU)
 
 
   
a PA Activity  price   
GADJ  Government  consumption    c PM  
 
Import price (domestic currency) 
adjustment  factor 
GOVSHR  Government share in nominal  
 
Composite commodity price  
absorption 
' c PQ  
INVSHR  Investment share in nominal  
 
Value-added price (factor income 
  absorption 
a PVA  
per unit of activity) 
fa QF   Quantity demanded of factor f  
 
ce for  
  from activity a 
c PX   Aggregate producer pri
commodity  c 
c QG Government  con   sumption   
 
c  
  demand for commodity c 
ac PXAC   Producer price of commodity 
for activity a 
ch QH Quantity consumed of com   modity 
 
  of activity 
  c by household h 
a QA Quantity level 
  45a QINTA   Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
 input 
c QD   Quantity sold domestically of 
 domestic  output 
ca QINT   Quantity of commodity c as  
  intermediate input to activity a 
c QE   Quantity of exports 
 
c QINV   Quantity of investment demand  
  for commodity c 
c QQ   Quantity of goods supplied to  
 domestic  market  (composite   
 supply) 
c QM   Quantity of imports of commodity 
 c 
c QT   Quantity of commodity c  
  demanded as trade input 
' i MPS   Marginal propensity to consume 
  by household h  
c QX   Quantity of domestic output of 
 commodity  c 
 
QXAC   Quantity of output of commodity 
  c from activity a 
f YF   Income of factor f 
 
a QVA   Quantity of (aggregate) value added  YG  Government  revenue 
TABS  Total nominal absorption  i YI   Income of (INSDNG) institution i 
i TINS              Direct tax for domestic non- 
  governmental institution i (INSDNG) 
 
f i YIF   Income to domestic institution i  
 from  factor  f 
' i i TRII   Transfers from institution i’ to 
  institution i’ (both in set INSDNG) 
f WF   Average price of factor f 
 
Source: Löfgren et al. (2002). 
 
 
Symbol     Explanation 
 
Exogenous variables 
Symbol     Explanation 
CPI   Consumer price index  f QFS   Quantity of supplied factor 
FSAV   Foreign savings (FCU)  MPSADJ   Savings rate scaling factor 
DTINS   Change in domestic institution tax
 share 
fa WFDIST   Wage distortion factor for factor f 
  in activity a 
IADJ   Investment adjustment factor  GADJ             government consumption adjustment 
 factor 
TINSADJ       direct scaling factor  f WFAT            After tax price of unskilled labour 
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Available closures in the standard CGE-model  
Factor Market Government Rest of World Savings-Investment
FAC-1 GOV-1 ROW-1 SI-1
Fixed factor supply; Flexible government savings; Fixed foreign savings; Fixed capital formation;
flexible wages;  fixed direct tax rates flexible real exchange rate uniform MPS point change 
mobile factors for selected institutions
FAC-2* GOV-2 ROW-2 SI-2
Flexible factor supply; Fixed government savings; Flexible foreign savings; Fixed capital formation;
fixed wages;  uniform direct tax rate, point fixed real exchange rate scaled MPS for selected
mobile factors change for selected  institutions
institutions
FAC-3 GOV-3 SI-3
Fixed factor supply; Fixed government savings; Flexible capital formation;
fixed wages; scaled direct tax rates for fixed MPS for all non-gov.
immobile factors selected institutions institutions
(activity specific)
SI-4
Fixed investment and gov. 
consumption absorption 
shares (flexible quantities);
uniform MPS point change 
for selected institutions
SI-5
Fixed investment and gov.
consumption absorption
shares (flexible quantities);
scaled MPS for selected 
institutions
* For the purpose of my model, this model has been extended from the pre-programmed case by fixing the 
post-tax-real wage  instead of the pre-tax real wage.  
 
Macroeconomic balances 
The macroeconomic balances include balances for savings-investment, the government and 
the external balance.  
 
Concerning the government balance
77, there are basically two options for closures. The first 
possible closure option for the government balance uses flexible direct tax rates and fixed 
                                                 
77 which relates to equation (40) in Appendix C: YG = EG + GSAV, where YG are governmental revenues, EG 
are governmental expenditures and GSAV are governmental savings. 
  47governmental savings. The second option, which is used in this study, is one where all tax 
rates, except those changed in the fiscal reform, are fixed. In a study of tax reforms, fixed 
direct tax rates are a necessary condition as it ensures that the changes in tax levels imposed 
through the specific tax reform are the only tax changes taking place. A revenue-neutral fiscal 
reform can then be ensured by recycling exactly the amount raised from the environmentally 
motivated taxes. The level of real government consumption is exogenous. 
 
When it comes to the external balance,
78 foreign savings constitute the difference between all 
receipts and expenditures of foreign exchange. As transfers between the rest of the world and 
domestic institutions and factors are fixed, either the real exchange rate or the current account 
deficit must be adjusted to maintain the external balance. In this model, foreign savings are 
assumed to be fixed, implying that the exchange rate is instead free to vary. This is the most 
common approach used for static CGE-models, motivated by the fact that it prevents 




Finally, a closure rule must be specified for the savings-investment balance.
80 There are 
various options for closure rules for the savings-investment balance in the IFPRI model. The 
main difference between the various options available is related to whether savings or 
investments should be endogenous. If savings are chosen to be endogenous, the savings rates 
of non-government institutions are adjusted to maintain the fixed level of real investment. If, 
on the other hand, investment is assumed to be endogenous, the savings-rates for all non-
government institutions are held fixed while the quantity of investment is adjusted to equal 
the level of savings. In this study, the first closure rule is used, i.e. the level of real investment 
is fixed. However, this is of minor importance for the policy reform studied in this paper: as 
the foreign savings are chosen to be fixed and a revenue-neutral fiscal reform also ensures 
                                                 
78 which relates to equation (39) in Appendix C: M + Net Transfers – X = FSAV, where M are imports, X are 
exports and FSAV are foreign savings. 
79 In this model, the export volumes might be affected by the choice of the domestic price index (DPI) as the 
numerarie. Export volumes are determined by the relative price of exports and domestic goods, and while the 
DPI is held fixed, a decrease in the domestic price of some goods will imply an increase in the domestic prices of 
other goods.  As this constraint might affect the generation of exports volumes, an explicit analysis of the effects 
on export/import ratios is avoided by choosing fixed foreign savings. Therefore, although the Namibian 
exchange rate is tied to the South African rand, and South Africa is the main trading partner, fixed foreign 
savings (and a flexible exchange rate) are chosen here. 
80 This is related to equation (42) in Appendix C and can be written: PSAV + GSAV + FSAV = INV, where PSAV 
are private savings, GSAV are governmental savings, FSAV are foreign savings and INV is investment. 
  48governmental savings to be fixed, there is no need for private savings to be adjusted in order 
to maintain the fixed level of investment. 
 
Appendix E – Sensitivity analysis of fish rent taxation and the inclusion of 
an approximate land rent tax, and results of other key variables  
 
Due to the uncertainty associated with the calculation of actual fish rents, there is a possibility 
that the taxable fish rent might be over-estimated. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis has been 
conducted concerning the size of fish rent taxation for the results of the environmental fiscal 
reform. The results from the sensitivity analysis, where the fish rent taxation is decreased to 
50 per cent, are shown in table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: Effects on target variables for the case of fish rent taxation being 50% 
Percentage change as compared to base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Effect on real GDP 0.07 0.06 0.19 -0.03 -0.04
Effect on employment for unskilled labour 0.2 0.16 0.59 -0.09 -0.12
Change in real consumption:
                  - among the poorest households 0.24 0.45 0.51 0.39 0.89
                  - among the richer households 0.08 -0.19 0.29 -0.48 -0.96
 
 
It is clear that while higher fish rent taxation allows for higher tax revenues, which increase 
the possibility of achieving additional benefits through different forms of recycling, the 
directions of the results do not change depending on the level of fish rent capturing. In fact, 
all qualitative results presented for total rent capture still hold also in a case of 50 per cent rent 
capturing. These results are intuitive; as the model does not take entry effects into account, 
the taxation of rents, unlike the other taxes in the model, is non-distortionary. 
 
Although the lack of reliable estimates of actual land rents prevented a formal analysis of land 
rent taxation in this paper, it is interesting to point out what the likely effects of such a policy 
would be. A variant of the model is simulated where an approximate land rent tax of about 50 
per cent of the total mixed factor in the commercial agricultural sector (assuming that land 
constitutes half of the mixed factor) is included. The results indicate that the GDP and 
  49employment effects will not change as long as the sum of fish rent and land rent taxes is equal 
to the case of 100 per cent fish rent taxation. Concerning the distributional impacts, taxation 
of land rents in the commercial agricultural sector will have a greater impact on income 
distribution than the fish rent tax; rich households in the farming business will be 
considerably less well off as their factor income will decrease significantly when land rents 
are taxed. 
 
Table 6: Results of other key variables (rent taxation 100%) 
Percentage change as compared to base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Consumer Price Index -0.8 -1.0 1.4 0.2 0.3
Change in production of: 
 - Commercial Agriculture 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0
 - Traditional Agriculture 0.8 1.0 2.3 0.1 0.2
 - Fish 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0
 - Fish processing 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
 - Mining 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0
 - Meat production 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
 - Grain Milling 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
 - Beverages production 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
 - Industry  0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0
 - Construction 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
 - Water 0.2 0.3 0.7 -0.1 -0.2
 - Electricity 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.1
 - Services 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.1
 - Hotels and Restaurants 0.5 0.2 0.8 -0.3 -0.5
 - Transport 0.4 0.1 1.3 -0.2 -0.4
 - Government services 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Change in real factor income (to households):
 - Mixed factor commercial agriculture 1.8 2.8 0.6 0.2 0.4
 - Mixed factor traditional agriculture 2.3 3.8 4.2 0.0 0.1
 - Skilled Labour 1.5 1.1 -0.9 -0.2 -0.4
 - Unskilled Labour 0.5 0.4 1.1 -0.1 -0.2
 
 
 
 
  50